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Abstract
In light of the renewed challenge to construct effective “Early Warning Systems” for
sovereign debt crises, we empirically evaluate the predictive power of econometric models
developed so far across developed and emerging country regions. We propose a different
specification of the crisis variable that allows for the prediction of new crisis onsets as
well as duration, and develop a more powerful dynamic-recursive forecasting technique to
generate more accurate out-of-sample warning signals of sovereign debt crises. Our results
are shown to be more accurate compared to the ones found in the existing literature.
Keywords : sovereign debt crisis; early warning system; logit; dynamic signal extraction;
dynamic-recursive forecasting
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, which hit the major advanced economies
and affected many emerging and developing countries, governments were forced to bail out
and recapitalize their failing banking systems. Such interventions resulted in large fiscal
deficits at the same time as their economies slowed after the burst of the property bubble.
As a consequence, several European nations, in particular Greece, Portugal, Ireland and
Spain, faced a prolonged debt crisis, unable to repay or refinance their sovereign debt
and having to rely on the assistance of other Eurozone countries, the IMF and the ECB.
Considering the economic and social effects of sovereign debt crises at both national and
international levels, it has become increasingly important to construct financial monitoring
tools that can forewarn the build-up of such financial turmoil. The main purpose of such
systems is to provide policymakers with some lead time to take corrective actions that
would help avert, or at least mitigate, the damage associated with an approaching crisis.
Since the late 1990s, several studies have attempted to develop a framework for such
Early Warning Systems (EWS) using various econometric models.1 However, the fore-
casting performance of these EWS was not generally satisfactory, especially in predicting
out-of-sample crisis incidents (Berg et al., 2005). The challenge of designing an effective
EWS escalated even further when the pre-2008 models failed to foresee the severity and
international span of this recent global crisis (Candelon et al., 2014). As a result, sev-
eral modified econometric methods have recently been introduced in the literature, which
appear to outperform the traditional techniques in forecasting a specific type of financial
crisis, or crises in a specific type of economy. However, no study has attempted to cross-
evaluate the performance of these recent methods in forewarning sovereign debt crises in
different regions.
The present study attempts to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, given
the distinct nature of national economies, their vulnerability to shocks and the effectiveness
of their institutions and policy responses, the causes and associated leading indicators of
sovereign debt crises can reasonably be expected to differ across countries. Yet, until
recently, the focus of modeling EWS for sovereign defaults was on developing countries
1See e.g. Frankel and Rose (1996); Kaminsky et al. (1998); Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998);
Peter (2002); Manasse et al. (2003).
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only2, usually pooled into a single group. Our study, on the other hand, investigates the
possibility of signaling indicator differences between developed and developing countries,
and between different regions; our results support the notion of regional heterogeneity of
forewarning indicators. Next, we evaluate and contrast the predictive performance of two
recently developed econometric methods, namely the multinomial logit regression and the
dynamic signal extraction approach vis-a-vis our own, novel specification of the binary logit
model, in which the crisis variable accounts for all periods in which a country suffered a
debt crisis as individual crisis episodes. In addition, we develop and apply a new dynamic-
recursive forecasting technique to generate more accurate out-of-sample warning signals.
We find that our binary logit specification significantly outperforms that of the multinomial
logit and the traditional binary logit models prevalent in the literature, and to some extent
also that of the dynamic signal extraction model.
The remainder of the paper is then structured as follows: section 2 surveys the findings
of the previous literature, while section 3 summarizes the data and performs a preliminary
quantitative analysis of the potential EWS indicators. The econometric methods and their
results are then outlined in section 4, the warning indicators and the results of the “horse-
race” are presented in section 5, while section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Previous Literature
Empirical studies that focus on constructing EWS for financial crises have mostly relied on
one of two main approaches. Kaminsky et al. (1998) developed the (static) signal extrac-
tion approach, a non-parametric method that entails identifying and monitoring certain
variables that tend to behave in an unusual manner in the build-up to financial or economic
distress. This model is designed so as to signal an impending crisis if these indicators ex-
ceed a certain threshold value, calculated as a specific percentile of each indicator’s sample
distribution. More recently, Casu et al. (2012) proposed a dynamic (non-sample-specific)
choice of the threshold that focuses more on the volatility of the indicators. For this, they
specified the threshold as a certain number of standard deviations away from the variable’s
long-run mean. Whereas the static approach was developed in the context of currency
2This is mainly due to the fact that there were previously no major concerns about governments in
developed countries not being able to meet their obligations to an extent that would progress into a serious
debt crisis.
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crises, and the dynamic one for the detection of banking distress, neither specification has
been used for the modeling of an EWS for sovereign defaults, with the exception of Savona
and Vezzoli (2015).
Frankel and Rose (1996) alternatively proposed the utilization of logit or probit regres-
sion models to estimate the probability of an approaching currency crisis. Manasse et al.
(2003) and Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) analogously applied pooled logit models to ex-
amine debt crises in emerging economies. Manasse et al. (2003) argued that logit models
tend to perform better than probit ones when the dependent variable is not evenly dis-
tributed between the two outcomes, i.e. crisis and no crisis; this is usually the case as crisis
events are not too common. More recently, Jedidi (2013) attempted to predict sovereign
debt crises using a fixed-effects logit model while including a number of developed coun-
tries, whereas Pescatori and Sy (2007) and Lausev et al. (2011) applied a random-effects
model instead.
It is important to note that EWS that are based on binary dependent variable models,
where the crisis variable assumes the value of one for the periods a country is hit by a
crisis and zero otherwise, have an inherent endogeneity problem. This is due to the fact
that the behavior of the indicator variables is affected both by the crisis itself and the
policies undertaken to mitigate it. Furthermore, the signaling indicators can be reasonably
expected to behave differently during tranquil times as compared to post-crisis periods,
where the economy is undergoing an adjustment process to recover from a crisis. Hence,
combining observations of tranquil periods with those of post-crisis ones into a single (zero)
group can lead to a form of bias; Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) referred to this as “post-
crisis bias”. To avoid this pitfall, several authors (e.g. Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007;
Savona and Vezzoli, 2015) dropped the post-crisis observations from their sample, however
thereby suffering from loss of information, while others (e.g. Peter, 2002; Manasse et al.,
2003) used a dummy variable to allow for different coefficients in the post-crisis periods.
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006), on the other hand, suggested the use of a multinomial
crisis variable instead that reflects all three states of the economy. Ciarlone and Trebeschi
(2005), employing an earlier (2002) version of Bussiere and Fratzscher, investigated its
performance in predicting debt crisis episodes in the case of emerging economies.
Several other less common methods were proposed in the literature. Fuertes and Kalo-
tychou (2007) used the K-means clustering approach, which entails assigning every observa-
tion to the cluster with the nearest mean vector so as to maximize within-cluster similarity
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and between-cluster discrepancy. However, their results showed that the binary logit re-
gression outperforms this approach in the out-of-sample period. Moreover, Manasse et al.
(2003) and Manasse and Roubini (2009) used regression tree analysis, while Fioramanti
(2008) applied artificial neural network models to predict sovereign defaults. However, the
author noted that despite its better ability to predict crises than probit regressions, neural
network models do not give any marginal effects interpretation of the individual signaling
indicators, and thus are less useful as a policy tool.
There appears to be a widespread consensus in previous studies regarding significant
indicators that could act as explanatory variables for debt crises. In particular, several
ability-to-pay indicators are emphasized, such as the external debt ratio, growth in foreign
exchange reserves and export earnings, reflecting the ability to service debt. In addition,
often highlighted is the importance of current account deficits as a measure of illiquidity
risk, and other macroeconomic indicators that affect a country’s capacity to meet its obliga-
tions. Further indicators, such as trade openness and measures of macroeconomic stability,
were also suggested by the willingness-to-pay approach, pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981); here defaults are modeled as an event where a sovereign chooses to repudiate its
debt if the perceived costs of defaulting are less than the benefits. Additionally, the sur-
vey of Reinhart (2002), covering about 60 countries over the period 1979-1999, conveyed
that 84% of the sampled debt crises were preceded by a currency crisis. Hence, variables
that are well-suited for predicting currency crisis could also be expected to have some ex-
planatory power in EWS for sovereign defaults. Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014) carried
out a recent comprehensive review3 regarding these issues, summarizing the empirically
significant factors and their observed effect on the probability of sovereign default.
3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
Our panel consists of 38 advanced and emerging economies during the period 1980-2012.
We rely on an annual frequency of the data, as sovereign debt crises tend to last for
prolonged periods and show persistence (Manasse et al., 2003). For the construction of the
EWS and the estimation of our models we only use the sub-sample 1980-2005, whereas the
seven-year period from 2006 to 2012 is used to evaluate the out-of-sample forecasts. This
is a challenging exercise given the limited occurrence of previous sovereign debt problems
3See Table 1 in Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014).
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in advanced countries, which makes the training of the EWS rather difficult. The selection
of countries is guided mainly by data availability; it covers four main regions4: Africa and
the Middle East, South and East Asia, Latin America and Western Europe. The list of
countries considered in each region, along with details on each crisis incident, is outlined
in Appendix A.
3.1 Sovereign Defaults and their Indicators
To capture both actual and potential defaults on sovereign debt, Manasse et al. (2003)
defined a country to be in crisis either if it is rated by Standard & Poor’s as being in
default (i.e. is failing to meet its external obligations) or if it receives a loan from the
IMF in excess of 100% of its quota as an extensive rescue package. The same definition
was later applied by Fioramanti (2008), Manasse and Roubini (2009), Savona and Vezzoli
(2015) and Jedidi (2013). Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) included other events as well:
in addition to the ones mentioned above, they also consider a country to be in crisis if
the amount of overdue interest or principal payments is more than 5% of its outstanding
external debt, or if it engaged in any restructuring or rescheduling schemes.
To make our results comparable to the ones found in the previous literature, we employ
the same crisis definitions. Hence, in the case of emerging economies, the dependent vari-
able (DCit) assumes unity if any of the four following events occurs, and is zero otherwise:
(1) accumulated interest and/or principal arrears exceed 5% of the outstanding debt; (2)
receiving a loan from the IMF in excess of 100% of the country quota; (3) cumulative
credit obtained from the IMF increases above 200% of the quota; (4) engaging in a debt
restructuring (buybacks or reductions) or rescheduling scheme that involves more than
20% of the outstanding debt. With respect to developed countries, we use a slightly dif-
ferent rule5 due to the lack of reported details on the arrears and the amounts involved in
restructuring and rescheduling programs. Therefore, for developed countries, in addition
4We do not include countries from Eastern and Central Europe, as their data are only available from
1995 onwards. This leaves only ten observations per country to make out-of-sample forecasts of seven
years, which is clearly not enough of a training period for the EWS, especially given that those countries
experienced a very limited number of debt crises during this period (see to Table 1 in Manasse and Roubini,
2009).
5 As a robustness check, we use this alternative rule to define debt crises in emerging economies as well.
A simple correlation test reveals that the dependent variable using this rule is 81.6% linearly correlated
with the debt crisis variable using the definition prevalent in the literature. We find that estimation results
are qualitatively the same for all three emerging regions, except for some changes in the significance of the
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to the two events involving loans from the IMF, the crisis index is also set to one if the
outstanding government debt exceeds 150% of the nominal value of GDP6.
Regarding the indicator variables that could be used to provide warning signals of a
forthcoming crisis, Table 1 illustrates that these can be grouped into four main categories.
The first group reflects the exposure of a country to sovereign debt problems. A higher
stock of external debt and/or IMF credit compared to the country’s GDP increases the
chances of unsustainable debt. Moreover, to measure the burden of servicing external debt,
we consider the GDP-weighted average of the bank lending interest rates in seven major
developed countries. The health of the country’s external sector is captured in the second
group, where the erosion of foreign exchange reserves is expected to raise the likelihood
of sovereign default. On the other hand, a stronger current account balance, growth of
export revenues, and net inflows of FDI reduce the country’s financial need for acquiring
foreign debt. A less clear impact on the probability of default is that of the change in trade
openness: a low degree can have an adverse effect on trade surpluses and make the country
more willing to repudiate its debt, whereas increased free trade can make the economy
more vulnerable to external shocks.
With respect to the third group, domestic macroeconomic variables can reasonably be
expected to show some deterioration prior to a debt crisis. Specifically, lower growth of real
GDP and reduced national savings can reduce the country’s ability to meet its obligations.
Furthermore, a rise in the rate of inflation and the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves
reduce external competitiveness and reflect the extent of unbacked implicit government
liabilities. This may lead to a confidence crisis, as lenders suspect that the government is
attempting to inflate away the value of its external debt. We also consider the overvaluation
of the real exchange rate7 to capture the effect of an approaching currency crisis on the
ability to meet external obligations. While larger government expenditures can increase the
likelihood of a debt crisis, governments usually undergo austerity measures during times of
crisis. Thus, higher public spending can also be associated with tranquil periods, where the
likelihood of a debt crisis is minimal. Finally, we include three variables to investigate the
variables; however, the forecast performance of the models is poorer. Detailed results are available from
the authors upon request.
6This particular ratio is chosen following IMF estimates that the median maximum sustainable debt
level ranges between 100-190% of GDP; see IMF (2011) for further details.
7This variable is measured as the negative deviation of REER (measured in domestic currency) from
its long-run trend.
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possibility of spillover from the banking sector. Whereas growing bank assets and a higher
ratio of domestic credit can reflect the development of the banking industry, the latter can
also increase the vulnerability of the banking sector to macroeconomic shocks. In addition,
we also consider net bank claims (loans minus deposits) on the central government.
The last column in Table 1 summarizes the previous studies that considered each po-
tential variable in their analysis. The data on the indicators are collected from four main
databases: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank Development Indicators,
World Economic Outlook, and the World Bank Global Financial Database.
3.2 Quantitative Analysis
We conduct a preliminary analysis to investigate how the candidate variables tend to
behave around default episodes compared to tranquil periods, and thus whether they are
expected to perform well as signaling indicators. Accordingly, Table 2 depicts the respective
mean of each variable in the global sample during normal vs. crisis years, along with a t-
test of the population means being the same for the two periods. The results are presented
over the global sample and in each country group separately8.
It is evident from this table that there is a tangible difference across the regions with
respect to the candidate EWS indicators. Specifically, the external sector variables seem to
behave significantly different around crises in Asia and Latin America, while the domestic
macroeconomic conditions seem to play the major role in Africa. In developed countries
only the debt exposure variables appear to be potentially important signaling indicators
of debt crises. Nonetheless, a small set of variables appears as good crisis indicators in
most regions. Primarily, a rise in the global lending rate significantly increases the cost
of servicing external debt and magnifies the likelihood of sovereign defaults in general.
Likewise, the erosion of foreign exchange reserves can act as a potentially good indicator
of debt problems. In the case of emerging economies, two additional variables seem to play
8We also conduct a t-test of the population variances of the indicator variables to check whether their
variability is significantly different in normal vs. in crisis periods. The results of the test are reported in
Appendix B. It can be noted that most variables that had significant mean changes across both periods
have also experienced significant changes in their variability, except for the global interest rate, the current
account, and national savings. However, as the number of observations in the normal and crisis periods are
different (crisis periods account for only 23% of the sample), comparisons of the variance of the indicators
need to be treated with caution as they do not necessarily allow for comparing like with like.
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an important role in the possibility of crises, namely foreign capital flows and national
savings.
To act as an effective forewarning indicator of sovereign defaults, it is not sufficient for
a variable to act differently during times of distress, but also before trouble starts building
up. In order to highlight the candidate indicators that can signal an approaching crisis,
Figure 1 illustrates how the mean of each variable changes on average from normal periods
to pre-crisis years, during crisis episodes, and after the crisis hits the economy. According
to this graph, factors like foreign exchange reserves, M2, export growth, current account
balance, trade openness, and national savings have a distinctive behavior during pre-crisis
periods compared to after the crisis hits the economy. Other factors, like total external
debt, global interest rate, FDI, real exchange rate, and bank claims show a sharp change
in behavior before the crisis hits the economy and only change slightly afterwards, but in
the same direction. Unlike the two previous types of factors, which are expected to prove
significant in predicting debt crises, there is another group of factors that only changes
behavior markedly after the onset of the crisis. These are mainly: inflation, IMF credit,
government expenditures, domestic credit, and bank assets. This group of variables is not
expected to perform well as EWS signaling indicators (although IMF credit does increase
well before crisis onsets, but only slightly compared to afterwards).
4 Methodology of EWS
In order to formally test the significance of the variables and their performance as signaling
indicators of sovereign debt crises in the different regions, we apply three recently developed
econometric techniques, namely the dynamic signal extraction approach and binary and
multinomial logit regressions. This section outlines these methods and their results.
4.1 Dynamic Signal Extraction Approach
This approach entails setting critical threshold levels for the crisis indicators, such that
if any variable crosses its specified threshold (above or below, depending on whether the
variable increases or decreases the probability of debt crises), it is said to signal an imminent
crisis over a given time period h, called the crisis window. For each variable over seven
different multiples of standard deviations (ranging from 0.5 to 3) and for four types of
9
Table 2: Quantitative Analysis of Debt Crisis Indicator Means
Full Model Regional Models
Indicator xNoCrisis xCrisis t-stat Dev. Asia Latin Africa
Debt Exposure
Total Debt 69.1 96.7 -1.3 × × X ×
IMF Credit 0.3 1.7 -6.1* X × X ×
Global Interest 8.4 11.0 -5.1* X X X X
External Sector
ForeignExch Reserves 16.4 6.2 9.3* X X X X
Export Growth 5.9 3.0 1.8 × × × ×
Current Account -0.7 -4.1 4.9* × X X ×
Trade Openness 81.8 63.5 3.7* × X X ×
FDI 3.3 1.6 5.9* × X X X
Macroeconomic Condition
Real GDP Growth 4.1 2.0 2.4* X × X ×
Inflation 6.8 28.9 -3.9* × × X X
M2/Reserves 10.0 15.0 -1.2 × × X X
REER Overval 2.2 -10.5 5.4* × × X X
Gov Expenditures 15.7 15.0 0.7 × × × ×
National Saving 23.7 17.2 6.1* × X X X
Banking Sector
Domestic Credit 69.6 60.3 1.2 × × X ×
Bank Assets 71.0 56.0 2.5* X × X ×
Gov Bank Loans 12.7 16.6 -1.4 × × X ×
Notes: The first two columns depict the full-model variable means during tranquil and crisis
periods, respectively. Column three shows the Welch adaptation of the t-test of mean differences
to account for unequal variances and sample sizes of the two economic states. The result of the
mean-difference t-test in each region separately is illustrated in the last four columns. Both *
and Xdenote statistical significance of the mean differences at the 95% level, while × denotes
no significant difference in the means.
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long-run means (fixed and rolling), a grid search is applied in order to identify the optimal
threshold that simultaneously minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio (NTSR) and maximizes
Youden’s J-statistic.9
We define the forward-looking response variable DCsit to capture the incidents of ap-
proaching debt crises in country i over the period t within a specific crisis window h:
DCsit =
{
1 if ∃ k = 1, . . . , h s.t. DCi,t+k = 1
0 otherwise
(1)
where DCit refers to the binary crisis index (defined below). Three different crisis windows
h are included in the grid search (one, two and four years)10. The results indicate that the
two-year specification is preferable, as it improves the NTSR of the majority of indicators
compared to the four-year specification, and does not cause significant losses compared
to the one-year specification. Therefore, we set h = 2. After identifying the optimal
thresholds, the indicators can be evaluated and ranked according to three different criteria:
(a) the percentage of crises correctly forewarned, (b) the optimal NTSR, and (c) the
average lead time of the signals (i.e. the average number of periods in advance of the crisis
when the first signal occurs).
The results of the grid search are reported in Table 3 for the global sample and for each
region. It can be noticed from this table that the majority (about 75%) of the variables
have a NTSR ≤ 0.5 in Latin America and in Africa and the Middle East, whereas in the
developed countries and in South and East Asia only few indicators can provide reliable
signals of approaching debt crises. The most prominent indicators are, generally, IMF
credit, global interest rate, foreign exchange reserves, current account balance and domestic
credit, which have the lowest NTSR ratios.
The overall lead time of the signals (column 3) is not very long, though. Only four
variables tend to issue their first signals two years in advance, namely IMF credit, global
interest rate, the current account and foreign exchange reserves. The signals of four other
variables have a lead time of more than 18 months; these are export growth, FDI, ratio of
9 The NTSR is the ratio of false alarms (noise) to the correct signals issued by the model, whereas the
J-statistic is calculated as the difference between the correct signals and the false alarms. See subsection 5.2
for full details of the calculation of these measures.
10These windows are chosen in line with the bulk of the literature (see e.g. Peter, 2002; Ciarlone and
Trebeschi, 2005; Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2006; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). One year is the shortest
possible forecast window, since the data are annual; the window is then increased from there to ideally
allow policymakers more time to take pre-emptive measures.
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M2 to reserves and national savings. The rest of the indicators considered start signaling
an approaching debt crises only one year in advance. The shortest average lead time is
that of the warnings issued by overvaluation of the domestic currency; this is not surprising
given the high degree of volatility in exchange rates.
Taking a closer look at the separate regions, and consistent with the primary t-tests
conducted in the previous section, the debt exposure variables are the major signaling
indicators in developed countries, having the lowest NTSR ratios. They are also impor-
tant forewarning indicators in South-East Asia, while neither the domestic macroeconomic
variables nor the banking sector seem to act as significant indicators. On the other hand,
the external sector appears to provide more accurate warning signals of debt crises in Latin
America and Africa. Thus, it can be noted that, save for the debt exposure variables that
appear to issue good warning signals in all regions, there is a distinct set of indicators that
performs best in each region, which supports the notion of regional heterogeneity of the
signaling variables.
4.2 Binary Logit Model
In order to be able to construct an EWS that can predict the likelihood of an upcoming
crisis as well as its duration, and to avoid post-crisis bias without having to drop potentially
valuable observations from the sample, we include all periods in which a country suffered
a debt crisis as individual crisis episodes. Thus, the binary dependent variable DCit is set
to one for all crisis periods (as outlined in Appendix A) and is zero only during tranquil
times. We also consider a multinomial specification of the crisis variable, which accounts
for all three economic states (normal, crisis, post-crisis), as discussed in subsection 4.3.
The logit model estimates the probability of a crisis using the logistic distribution
function
Pr (Yit = 1) = F (Xit−hβ) =
eXit−hβ
1 + eXit−hβ
(2)
where F (·) is the cumulative logistic distribution, Xit−h is the vector of h-period lagged
explanatory variables11, Yit denotes the binary crisis variable DCit, and β is the vector of
coefficients.
11Henceforth, the lags will be suppressed for simplicity, but are implied in all following equations.
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Maximum likelihood estimation is then undertaken to obtain the parameters, where
the log-likelihood function is written as:
logL =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
[Yit lnF (Xitβ) + (1− Yit) ln (1− F (Xitβ))] (3)
We report the marginal effects, rather than the raw beta coefficients of the logged odds
ratio, in all results tables for simplicity of interpretation. Furthermore, the Huber-White ro-
bust variance estimator of the covariates is calculated and reported to account for country-
specific variances in all regression models (see Manasse et al., 2003, p. 19).
We examine the fit of five models: the global model that incorporates all countries
together, both developed and emerging, and four separate regional models. The two-year-
lagged marginal effect of each indicator on the probability of a debt crisis is displayed in
the upper panel of Table 4. In addition to these pooled regressions, Table 5 estimates
these five models using fixed- and random-effects panel regressions to account for possible
country-specific heterogeneity. The lower panel of the tables reports the corresponding
McFadden’s pseudo R2, the log-likelihood ratio and the BIC criteria of each model, along
with the in-sample percentage of correct crisis signals.
While subsection 5.1 discusses the general significant warning indicators of debt crises
using the three econometric methods, a quick glance at the results of the binary logit tables
shows that credit from the IMF, foreign exchange reserves, public spending, and domestic
credit have the major effects on the probability of an approaching debt crisis in South
and East Asia. The debt exposure and macroeconomic variables seem to be playing the
important role in Latin America, while in Africa and the Middle East total debt, foreign
exchange reserves, and national savings have the lead in anticipating sovereign default
problems. Finally, total debt, IMF credit, and the balance of the current account are the
main contributors to the probability of a debt crisis in West European countries.
In line with the results of Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006), who aimed to identify the
most accurate parametrization of a logit regression model, we also find that the fixed-effects
models that control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries describe the data better
than the pooled and the random-effects models. However, when it comes to forecasting
performance, the pooled logit model with full country homogeneity tends to significantly
outperform the more complex specifications. In fact, the pooled global models correctly
15
Table 4: Binary Logit Models of Sovereign Defaults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Global Asia Latin Africa Developed
Total Debt 0.028** -0.006 0.024** 0.016 1.001**
IMF Credit 0.300** 1.064** 0.088 0.164 22.638**
Global Interest 0.154** 0.076 0.083** 0.000
ForeignExch Reserves -0.119** -0.346** 0.005 -0.136** -1.974**
Trade Openness 0.010* 0.004 -0.004 0.017 0.735*
Current Account -0.060** -0.038* -6.186**
FDI -0.472** -0.230** -0.088 -7.418
Real GDP Growth -0.078** 0.055 -0.038* -0.037 -4.439
Inflation 0.001 0.182 0.046*
M2/Reserves 0.005 0.164** 0.037
REER Overval -0.025** 0.004 -0.008* -0.039**
Gov Expenditures -0.121** -1.217** -0.069** 0.065 -6.157
National Saving -0.099** -0.059 -0.032* -0.136** 0.378
Domestic Credit 0.010* 0.086** -0.010** -0.008
Bank Assets -0.016 -0.040*
Gov Bank Loans 0.038** 0.011 0.031
Asia 3.450**
Latin 5.225**
Africa 4.610**
N 912 192 288 216 216
Pseudo R2 0.584 0.595 0.665 0.622 0.947
Log-Likelihood -227.9 -27.6 -66.7 -54.7 -1.1
BIC 592.1 118.4 218.5 195.4 55.8
% of Correct Crises 87.1 90.9 93.4 94.1 100.0
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. The marginal effects, rather than the logit coefficients
of the five binary logit regressions, are reported in this table. For developed countries
total external debt is proxied by gross government debt due to data availability. The
lower panel depicts the number of observations used in each regression (N) over the in-
sample period 1980-2005, the Pseudo McFadden’s R2, the log-likelihood ratio, the Schwarz-
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and the percentage of in-sample crises correctly
signaled by each model, global and regional.
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Table 5: Binary Panel Logit Models using FE and RE
Global Asia Latin Africa Developed
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Total Debt 0.07** 0.02** -0.02 0.16* 0.22** 0.14** 0.09** 0.07** 0.85* 0.68**
IMF Credit 0.81** 0.91** 5.32* 3.98** 0.95** 0.96** 0.37 0.29 12.77* 15.56*
Global Interest 0.18** 0.12* -0.60 -0.41 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01
ForeignExch Reserves -0.21** -0.18** -2.43* -1.17* -0.34* -0.18 -0.33** -0.23* 1.51 -0.41
Trade Openness 0.02 0.02* -0.06 -1.34
Current Account 0.02 -0.03 -0.65* 0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.15* -0.98
FDI -0.60** -0.33** -2.01* -0.13 -0.94** -0.96** -0.74 -0.51 3.90 0.69
Real GDP Growth -0.05 -0.07** 0.70* 0.18 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.08 -2.94 -2.87
Inflation 0.01 0.02* 0.84* 0.23* 0.14 0.16** -0.43
M2/Reserves 0.11* -0.04 -2.03 -1.02 0.54* 0.64** 0.11 0.11
REER Overval -0.02* -0.03** 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.79 0.07
Gov Expenditures -0.06 -0.11** -0.19 -0.24* 0.33* 0.22 -1.37
National Saving 0.01 -0.03 -0.42 0.38 -0.19* -0.13 0.12 -0.07 -1.65 0.25
Domestic Credit 0.01 0.02* 0.65* 0.16* -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
Bank Assets -0.01 -0.05** -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07
Gov Bank Loans 0.02 0.04** 0.17 -0.08
N 624 912 96 192 288 288 192 216 50 225
Pseudo R2 0.618 0.460 0.796 0.733 0.824 0.719 0.752 0.625 0.858 0.814
Log-Likelihood -120.4 -230.6 -8.7 -16.4 -28.1 -54.4 -25.4 -49.2 -1.5 -3.4
BIC 343.8 583.9 76.7 110.9 129.8 193.7 124.4 184.4 34.4 71.9
% of Correct Crises 43.9 70.0 18.2 77.3 77.3 28.3 90.8 73.8 80.0 75.0
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. The marginal effects, rather than the logit coefficients of the
five fixed-effects (FE) and five random-effects (RE) binary logit regressions, are reported in this
table. FE have significantly smaller number of observations as the model excludes all countries
that did not experience a debt crisis over the in-sample period. For developed countries total
external debt is proxied by gross government debt due to data availability. The lower panel
depicts the number of observations used in each regression (N) over the in-sample period 1980-
2005, the Pseudo McFadden’s R2, the log-likelihood ratio, the Schwarz-Bayesian information
criterion (BIC), and the percentage of in-sample crises correctly signaled by each model, global
and regional.
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forewarned slightly less than 90% of the crisis episodes that occurred in the sample coun-
tries, while the fixed-effects model did not improve over a naive random guess (i.e. less
than 50%). Furthermore, it is evident from the highly significant coefficients of the regional
dummies included in the pooled global model, as well as the basic goodness-of-fit measures
and the in-sample predictions depicted in the lower panels of all three tables, that the
regional models consistently outperform the global one. Our results, hence, support the
assertion of Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) that heterogeneity seems to be regional rather
than country-specific.
4.3 Multinomial Logit Model
Whereas the binary logit regression estimates the effect of a set of explanatory variables on
a binary crisis variable, the multinomial logit model studies their effect on a multinomial
variable DCmit that allows for three states. The crisis index is defined as follows in this
case
DCmit =

0 if DCit = 0
1 if DCit−1 = 0 and DCit = 1
2 otherwise
(4)
where DCit denotes the binary crisis variable, and the value of zero reflects tranquil periods,
the value of one denotes the first year of the crisis (see also Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007;
Savona and Vezzoli, 2015), and two refers to the post-crisis periods until the country returns
to the normal state.
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure is utilized to regress the multinomial
dependent variable (Yit) on the lags of the proposed economic indicators (Xit) using the
cumulative logistic distribution function
Pr (Yit = 0) = F (Xitβ) =
1
1 + eXitβ1 + eXitβ2
Pr (Yit = 1) = F (Xitβ) =
eXitβ
1
1 + eXitβ1 + eXitβ2
Pr (Yit = 2) = F (Xitβ) =
eXitβ
2
1 + eXitβ1 + eXitβ2
(5)
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where β1 measures the effect of a change in the indicators on the probability of entering into
a crisis, while β2 measures their effect on the probability of being in the post-crisis period.
To make the reported coefficients comparable to those of the binary logit regression, we
report the marginal effects of the indicators. Furthermore, we continue to use the Huber-
White robust variance estimator to allow for country-specific variances.
A country usually undergoes two types of development in its economic state during
post-crisis periods. If the crisis deepens after it originally hit the economy, the economic
indicators will be expected to worsen. On the other hand, as the authorities undertake
corrective policies, the economic indicators may improve as the economy recovers from the
crisis and returns to its normal state. However, it is not possible ex-ante to identify which
development will take place or prevail. Therefore, we cannot form reasonable expectations
regarding the signs of the coefficients during the post-crisis periods. Table 6 presents the
results of the global and regional multinomial logit regressions, where the upper panel
depicts the marginal effects of the variables on the probability of entering into a new crisis,
with the lower panel focusing on the probability of being in a post-crisis period.
With respect to the Asian countries, the variables reflecting the extent of debt exposure
and the health of the banking system appear to have a significant effect on the probability
of going into crisis, as well as on being in one, with IMF credit having the largest marginal
effect. In Latin America, the results show that the indicators are only able to explain
the post-crisis periods rather than crisis onsets. This implies that the debt situation in
these countries tends to worsen after the entry year, which is also evident from the higher
marginal effects of the indicators in the post-crisis period compared to the crisis onset
periods. Turning to Africa and the Middle East, the overvaluation of the domestic currency
and diminishing national savings are both associated with crisis and post-crisis periods.
On the other hand, IMF credit, global interest rate and FDI can only explain the onset of
sovereign defaults, while increasing debt, the erosion of foreign exchange reserves and rising
rates of inflation are more observed during periods of recovery. Finally, the estimated model
for Western Europe shows that most indicators are statistically significant, where their
marginal effects are usually higher during the post-crisis periods, indicating the deepening
of the crises after their onset. The two indicators with the highest marginal effects are
credit from the IMF and government expenditures.
We proceed in the next section to discuss further the estimation results of all three
econometric methods together in order to identify the variables that can act as warning
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Table 6: Multinomial Logit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Global Asia Latin Africa Developed
C
ri
si
s
P
e
ri
o
d
D
C
m
it
=
1
Total Debt 0.020* 0.742** -0.001 0.012 0.176*
IMF Credit -0.357 -7.290** -0.888 -1.825* 2.262**
Global Interest 0.212** 0.154 0.465*
ForeignExch Reserves -0.114 -0.056 -0.027 -0.079 -1.989*
Trade Openness -0.009 0.110 -0.024 0.120*
Current Account -0.149** -0.080
FDI -0.184 0.778* -1.147*
Real GDP Growth -0.067* -0.102
Inflation -0.012 -0.409 -0.247
M2/Reserves -0.049 0.002 -1.018*
REER Overval -0.026* 0.110 -0.001 -0.088**
Gov Expenditures -0.027 0.058 0.094 -2.343*
National Saving -0.026 -0.134* -0.738**
Domestic Credit 0.010 0.464* -0.004 -0.003
Bank Assets 0.019 -0.778** 0.009
Gov Bank Loans 0.021 1.017* 0.003 0.009
P
o
st
-C
ri
si
s
P
e
ri
o
d
D
C
m
it
=
2
Total Debt 0.032** 0.335** 0.047** 0.025* 0.197**
IMF Credit 0.421** -0.050 0.226* 0.181 4.133**
Global Interest 0.148** 0.083* -0.019
ForeignExch Reserves -0.139** 0.184 -0.018 -0.178** -1.092**
Trade Openness 0.016** -0.057* -0.007 0.100**
Current Account -0.031 -0.065*
FDI -0.579** -0.555** 0.061
Real GDP Growth -0.091** -0.470*
Inflation 0.001 0.132 0.072**
M2/Reserves 0.019 0.263** -1.600*
REER Overval -0.026** -0.083* -0.009 -0.040**
Gov Expenditures -0.150** -0.096* 0.100 -1.502**
National Saving -0.116** -0.148** -0.809**
Domestic Credit 0.012* 0.223** -0.017** -0.010
Bank Assets -0.032* -0.349** -0.036
Gov Bank Loans 0.047** 0.382* 0.017 0.021
N 912 192 288 216 216
Pseudo R2 0.566 0.725 0.638 0.612 0.786
Log-Likelihood -275.2 -21.2 -89.9 -64.6 -5.8
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. The marginal effects, rather than the logit coefficients of the five
multinomial logit regressions, are reported in this table. For developed countries total external debt
is proxied by gross government debt due to data availability. The lower panel depicts the number of
observations used in each regression (N) over the in-sample period 1980-2005, the Pseudo McFadden’s R2
and the log-likelihood ratio.
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indicators of sovereign debt crises in general. Furthermore, we evaluate the constructed
EWS using a number of criteria to assess their relative performance.
5 Discussion and Evaluation
After detailing the various econometric methods used to construct EWS, this section fur-
ther examines and discusses their results, and conducts a horse-race between the con-
structed EWS to evaluate their performance from a policy-maker’s point of view.
5.1 Warning Indicators of Sovereign Defaults
Considering the estimated coefficients of the three econometric techniques in more detail,
we find that the variables suggested by economic theory and the preliminary quantitative
analysis are able to provide a good measure of the likelihood of an approaching debt crisis.
The estimation results show in particular that the debt exposure variables (ratio of external
debt to GDP and credit acquired from the IMF) are significant indicators in all regions,
which was also previously reported by Lausev et al. (2011) and Jedidi (2013). However,
the multinomial logit model shows that IMF credit is low before crisis onsets and high
afterwards in the case of emerging countries, but is high before and after for more advanced
economies. A probable explanation for this phenomenon is that developed countries may
have easier and quicker access to IMF funds, while emerging-country governments could
apply for a loan before the onset of a crisis and only obtain the funds after the crisis has
hit the economy. When using the binary logit estimation, the positive after-crisis impact
of the IMF credit appears to be dominant.
Another general finding that is consistent among all the regions is that governments
tend to keep their expenditures low before and during times of crises. Arguably, public
spending is increased only during tranquil times when the finances are available and there
is no serious threat of compounding unsustainable debt. In addition to these variables and
in line with the previous literature (Peter, 2002; Lausev et al., 2011), rising FDI inflows,
current account improvements, and growth of national savings tend to signal a reduced
need for external credit, and thus less pressure on government debt in Latin America. As
for the countries in Africa and the Middle East, inflation causes external debt servicing
to be more expensive, overvaluation of the domestic currency drains the required foreign
21
reserves to service maturing sovereign debts, and trade openness seems to be doing more
harm than good by making the African economies more vulnerable to foreign shocks.
These results are also consistent with those found by Manasse and Roubini (2009) and
Savona and Vezzoli (2015). With respect to South-East Asia, the accumulation of foreign
reserves increases the ability of the government to service its external obligations (as also
reported by Jedidi, 2013), whereas banking sector distress and increased pressure on the
real exchange rate tend to contribute to debt problems, leading to twin or even triple crises.
Finally, in developed countries, and consistent with Peter (2002) and Savona and Vezzoli
(2015), the rate of real GDP growth, the ratio of national savings to nominal GDP, and the
banking sector variables (domestic credit and bank assets growth) have a major influence
on the likelihood of debt crises.
5.2 EWS: A Horse-Race
The previous detailed discussion of the statistical significance of the proposed indicators of
sovereign debt problems, though important for policymakers, is not sufficient to conclude
whether the estimated models can act as an effective EWS. It is, therefore, imperative to
test and compare the forecasting performance of the different econometric methods. This
requires selecting a cut-off probability such that, if the predicted probability12 of any model
exceeded that threshold, the model is said to issue a signal of a forthcoming crisis. By
comparing these signals to the actual crisis episodes defined by the dependent variable, the
following contingency table can be constructed:
Crisis No Crisis
Signal A B
No Signal C D
12To obtain the predicted probabilities for the dynamic signal extraction models, the signals Sjt−h gen-
erated by the most reliable indicators j (with NTSR < 0.5), in each region r, are summarized into a
single composite crisis index Irt as follows: Irt =
∑n
j=1
Sjrt−h
NTSRrj
. The values of each composite indicator
are converted into a series of conditional probabilities of approaching crises in each country i. These are
calculated as the ratio between the number of times Irt falls within a lower and an upper bound (exoge-
nously determined over the in-sample period for each region separately) and a crisis did occur over the
crisis window, and the total number of periods it falls within this interval in general.
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where outcomes A and D reflect “good” signals of crisis and tranquil periods, respectively,
while outcome C depicts the failure to predict an actual crisis (i.e. “missed crisis”) and
outcome B denotes a “false alarm” as the warning signal was not followed by a crisis within
the specified crisis window.
Clearly, choosing a low (high) cut-off probability increases the probability of false alarms
(missed crises). In practice, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007) argued that false alarms are
less important to policymakers than missed crises, since the actual costs of adopting pre-
emptive policies are usually less severe than the significant economic and social losses of
unanticipated crises. On the other hand, Savona and Vezzoli (2015) warned against triv-
ializing the costs associated with false alarms, as they tend to trigger negative market
sentiments and affect international reputation. Furthermore, it should be noted that false
alarms are not always mistakes caused by the predictive failure of the EWS, but could sim-
ply be the result of undertaking suitable policy actions that were successful in mitigating
or avoiding a crisis that would have hit otherwise. In addition, due to the way the models
are designed, a signal issued “too early” (i.e. outside the crisis window) is also counted as
a false alarm, even though being followed by an actual crisis.
Therefore, most studies select the cut-off threshold so as to minimize a joint error
measure, that is, the in-sample NTSR, or to maximizes Youden’s J-statistic. The former
is calculated as the ratio of bad to good signals:
NTSR =
P (B|B ∪D)
P (A|A ∪ C) (6)
while the latter is defined as the hit rate (HR) minus the false alarm rate (FAR):
J = HR− FAR = P (A|A ∪ C)− P (B|B ∪D) (7)
We follow the recommendation of Savona and Vezzoli (2015) in selecting the optimal cut-off
probability that maximizes the J-statistic rather than the one that minimizes the NTSR,
as they found that the J-statistic is quite robust to extreme errors, whereas the NTSR
could lead to extreme thresholds causing close-to-zero FAR and negligible HR.
Hence, to assess the predictive power of the models considered, we calculate three mea-
sures, namely the percentage of crisis onsets and crisis periods (duration) correctly fore-
warned, along with the ratio of false alarm signals. These are calculated based on in-sample
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predictions, as well as the more policy-relevant out-of-sample predictions. With respect to
the parametric methods, we calculate two types of out-of-sample predictions. First, the
models are estimated once over a sub-sample of the data, and the regular h-step-ahead
forecast is calculated over the h most recent held out observations. We also implemented
a new recursive forecasting technique that allows for dynamic predictions. In particu-
lar, our dynamic-recursive forecasting technique estimates the model several times, each
time adding one further out-of-sample observation (“recursive”) along with the predicted
probability of the previous period (“dynamic”), and generating a 1-step-ahead forecast.
While a rolling-window forecast approach13 drops early observations and adds new ones,
keeping the forecast window constant, the recursive method is more of an incremental ap-
proach in that it adds one additional out-of-sample observation each time without dropping
older ones, then iteratively updates the model. This recursive approach was applied quite
recently in the context of constructing EWS for debt crises by Savona and Vezzoli (2015).
However, the originality of our approach stems from including a dynamic dimension to
the forecast process in that we incorporate the previous period’s predicted probability in
the following years recursive estimation. This dynamic updating, along with the recursive
iteration, makes the maximum amount of information available to the model during the
forecasting process, and hence can improve its predictive power. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this dynamic-recursive technique has not been implemented before in the context of
forecasting financial crises (be they currency, banking, or sovereign debt).
As a consequence, the sub-sample 1980-2005 is used to generate predictions of 2006;
then the sub-sample 1980-2006 and the predictions of 2006 are used to forecast the crisis
probability in 2007; and so on. Incorporating new information in the EWS as it becomes
available can reasonably be expected to improve significantly its forecasting performance.
The results are summarized in Table 7, where the first panel focuses on the in-sample
forecasts, the second panel depicts the regular out-of-sample, and the last panel presents
the dynamic-recursive forecasting performance.
Starting with the in-sample performance, the multinomial logit estimation does not
emerge as an appropriate method to construct effective EWS. In fact, it seems better
in predicting tranquil periods than crisis episodes, where the models are able to predict
correctly more than 90% of the tranquil periods in Latin America and Africa, and about
100% in Asia and developed countries. However, the HR of crisis episodes only range
13This is also referred to as the style rotation strategy by Levis and Liodakis (1999).
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between 55-75% in the different regions, which lies below the other two methods. On the
other hand, the binary logit method is shown to outperform significantly in its forecasting
performance. Particularly, in developed countries, it correctly predicts all onsets and crisis
periods without generating any false signals, compared to the higher FAR of 25% of the
dynamic signal extraction technique. Similar results are found in South-East Asia, where
all models predict correctly two of the three crisis onsets, but the binary logit model stands
out with lower FAR and a much higher HR of crisis periods of 90%. On the other hand,
with respect to Latin America and Africa, the dynamic signal extraction approach is able
to forewarn 87% of the crisis onsets in the former region and 100% in the latter. However,
this relatively high HR compared to the other two methods comes at the expense of a
higher FAR of over 25%. In addition, the dynamic signal extraction is only able to detect
half of the crisis episodes in these regions, while the binary logit models can forecast over
90% of the episodes with a more reasonable average of 10% FAR. In addition, the regional
heterogeneity suggested by the goodness-of-fit measures is further confirmed here, as the
HR of crisis onsets and episodes of the regional models significantly outperform those of
the global one. Therefore, we exclude the global model from our further analysis.
Compared to Savona and Vezzoli (2015), the only paper that previously used the signal
approach, we find that the dynamic version which takes the regional heterogeneity of the
indicators into consideration significantly outperforms the static version where developed
and emerging economies are pooled together. More specifically, their model was able to
predict correctly about 80% of the in-sample crises at a FAR of 45%. Our models, on the
other hand, have a collective HR of about 90% (being able to correctly predict 23 out of
the 26 crisis onsets) and generate almost half as many false alarms (25% on average) as the
static version. Our binary logit models that account for the entire crisis period also appear
to improve over the traditional models in the previous literature. In particular, Ciarlone
and Trebeschi (2005) generated 36% false signals while only correctly predicting 72% of the
in-sample crisis episodes, whereas the model estimated by Pescatori and Sy (2007) had a
sensitivity of 86% and a false alarm rate of 14%. Even Manasse et al. (2003), who were able
to issue about 5% false signals, could only foresee 75% of the crisis episodes. Furthermore,
Savona and Vezzoli (2015), as the only study that included developed countries, albeit
pooled with emerging markets, had an in-sample hit rate of 77% with a false alarm rate of
16%.
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Although in-sample forecasts are important for evaluating the performance of EWS,
the more relevant test for policymakers is that of out-of-sample forecasts. In this respect,
the figures in the lower two panels of Table 7 imply that, even when applying our novel
dynamic-recursive forecasting technique, the multinomial logit method continues to per-
form relatively poorly. It only predicted one of the three crisis onsets that occurred in
developed countries, and none of those that hit Latin America. On the other hand, the
dynamic signal extraction models correctly forewarned two of the three crisis onsets in
developed countries and 86% (six of the seven) of their entire crisis years. Furthermore, in
Latin America all crisis onsets and default periods are correctly forewarned at a slightly
lower FAR of around 20%. In Africa and the Middle East, where no new crises occurred
during the holdout period 2006-2012, the FAR remains around the in-sample range of
20%, while in South-East Asia it doubled to almost 40%.
However, the warning signals generated by the South-East Asian composite index can-
not be considered as real false alarms, but as indicators of an alarming debt situation that
did not progress into a full-fledged crisis. In fact, although no actual debt crises occurred
in these countries, it is evident that their sovereign debt condition was rather worrisome.
A study conducted by Jiang and Xu (2014) reported the alarming rapid growth of govern-
ment debt and argued that the outbreak of a debt crisis is a possibility in China. Moreover,
a recent report by Moody’s (2014) highlighted that India has a high fiscal deficit and a
large government debt burden that could become unsustainable if the current low GDP
growth and high inflation persist over the medium term. With respect to South Korea,
the ratio of government debt to GDP has also grown significantly over the holdout period.
Regarding the binary logit models, the regular forecasts are unable to detect either the
crisis onset or any of the four crisis periods in Latin America. In developed countries, five
out of the seven episodes (70%) and two of the three (67%) onsets are correctly forewarned.
These results are in line with the small number of papers that reported out-of-sample
forecasts, with Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) able to predict two out of five (40%) crisis
episodes in emerging economies, and Manasse et al. (2003) correctly forecasting 45% of
sovereign defaults. Nevertheless, our findings improve substantially when applying the
dynamic-recursive forecasting technique, proving the superiority of this method over the
regular forecasts. Particularly, in Asia, where no crises occurred during the holdout period,
all tranquil periods are captured without issuing any false alarms. In Latin America
and Africa, all crisis periods are correctly signaled while generating FAR of around 10%.
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Moreover, the estimated model in developed countries is able to forewarn the debt crises at
a lower false alarm rate than the one generated by the regular forecasting technique. These
ratios outperform to a great extent the most accurate EWS constructed so far. Between
Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) and Savona and Vezzoli (2015), a maximum of 75% of the
out-of-sample crisis episodes was forewarned with a false alarm rate of 15-30%. Fuertes
and Kalotychou (2007) had a better sensitivity ratio of 82%, but at a relatively high FAR
of 23%.
Thus, the overall results of the horse-race highlight the superiority of our specification
of the binary logit model over the more traditional ones, as well as over the multinomial
specification of the dependent variable. Furthermore, our dynamic-recursive forecasting
technique improves significantly on the regular out-of-sample forecasts, enabling the binary
logit models to closely match the performance of the dynamic signal approach, but with a
much reduced occurrence of false alarms.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates the performance of several econometric techniques (binary logit,
multinomial logit, dynamic signal extraction) recently developed to construct more effective
EWS for sovereign debt crises in different developed and developing country regions. We
contribute to the literature by, for the first time, designing a separate EWS for developed
countries, improving the specification of the binary logit models by treating the entire crisis
period as individual episodes, and developing a more accurate forecasting technique.
Our models show that, in order to construct an effective EWS for sovereign debt crises, it
is crucial to include variables that allow for the possibility of spillover from the banking sec-
tor and the foreign exchange market. Furthermore, the predictive performance of the EWS
is significantly improved when using simple pooled models that account for the regional
heterogeneity of the signaling indicators, and using the dynamic-recursive forecasting tech-
nique to generate out-of-sample forecasts. Regarding the in-sample forecast, the dynamic
signal approach can predict more crisis onsets, while the binary logit model outperforms in
generating significantly lower false alarms and correctly forewarning crisis duration. As for
out-of-sample performance, the binary logit model using our novel dynamic-recursive fore-
casting technique is able to forecast correctly most of the out-of-sample crises onsets and
periods, while generating half as many false signals as the dynamic signal extraction tech-
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nique. Multinomial logit models, on the other hand, fall behind the other two econometric
techniques in all cases.
Thus, in conclusion, an EWS based on our binary logit model can be recommended to
policymakers in the different regions considered, particularly when the avoidance of nega-
tive market sentiments and damage to international reputation, as potentially triggered by
false signals of sovereign debt problems, are high on their agenda. Possible extensions to
our work could allow for indicators with a forward-looking perspective in order to capture
the possibility of self-fulfilling crises. These might include credit default swaps, sovereign
bond spreads and other variables that can be used to assess sovereign credit ratings; these
would, however, need to be made available in developing countries on a more timely basis.
In addition, future research could attempt to include variables that express the possibility
of contagion from neighboring countries. Unfortunately, the annual frequency of the data
would rule out the use of same-year information on defaulting sovereigns for assessing the
possibility of contagion to other economies.
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A Appendix: Crisis Episodes by Country
Country Crisis Episodes Comment
Latin America
Argentina 1983-1992 Arrears exceeded 20% of total debt
2001-2005 Credit from IMF exceeded 500% of quota
Brazil 1983-1994 Massive rescheduling and restructuring schemes
1999 IMF credit exceeded 200% of country quota
2002-2003 IMF credit reached more than 600%
Mexico 1982-1990 40% of the debt was rescheduled or forgiven
1995-1996 IMF loans increased to more than 600%
Chile 1983-1990 Rescheduling of 20% of debt
Paraguay 1986-1990 Defaults on 20% of debt
Dominican Rep. 1983-1999 IMF loans increased to about 250% of quota
2003-2005 Rescheduling 20% of outstanding debt
2010-2011 IMF credit reached 400% of country quota
Ecuador 1983-1995 Arrears reached 40% of total debt
1999-2000 Rescheduling 30% of the debt
Venezuela 1989-1996 Rescheduling over 50% of the debt
Bolivia 1980-1985 Arrears increased to 20% of outstanding debt
1986-1994 IMF credit reached 200% of quota
Peru 1980-1997 Arrears increased to 50% of outstanding debt
Panama 1983-1997 Arrears reached about 60% of outstanding debt
Costa Rica 1981-1991 IMF credit reached over 200% of quota
South and East Asia
Indonesia 1998-2003 IMF credit of about 400% of quota
Philippines 1981-1990 10% of debt was restructured
China – No significant external debt problems
India – No significant external debt problems
Malaysia – No significant external debt problems
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Thailand 1981-1982 IMF loans increased to 280% of quota
1997-1999 IMF loans reached 400% of quota
South Korea 1980-1982 IMF loans reached 400% of quota
1997-1998 IMF credit accounted to over 1500% of quota
Singapore – No significant external debt problems
Middle East and Africa
Egypt 1980-1991 Arrears increase to more than 20% of debt
Jordan 1989-1994 Default on more than 10% of the debt
South Africa 1985-1989 Failure to meet about 50% of debt obligations
Lebanon 1985-1991 Arrears reached 12% of total debt
Morocco 1981-1989 Loans from IMF reached about 400% of quota
Tunisia 1986-1991 IMF credit reached 150% of country quota
Algeria 1990-1996 Rescheduling over 10% of debt principal
Nigeria 1988-1999 Defaulting on 60% of outstanding debt
Central Africa 1981-2006 Arrears increased to more than 30% of debt
Advanced Europe
Greece 2010–
Debt reached 160% of GDP, IMF credit is over 1700%
of quota
Portugal 1986 IMF credit amounted to 150% of quota
2011– IMF credit of 1700% of quota
Spain – No significant external debt problems
Ireland 2011– IMF credit reached 1300% of quota
Italy – No significant external debt problems
Belgium 1992-1994 Debt increased to over 140% of GDP
Sweden – No significant external debt problems
Germany – No significant external debt problems
UK – No significant external debt problems
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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B Appendix: Debt Crisis Indicator Variability
Full Model Regional Models
Indicator σNoCrisis σCrisis F -stat Dev. Asia Latin Africa
Debt Exposure
Total Debt 88.7 176.4 0.3* X × X ×
IMF Credit 0.8 2.0 0.2* X X X ×
Global Interest 3.3 4.3 0.6* × × X ×
External Sector
ForeignExch Reserves 19.7 7.5 6.9* × X X X
Trade Openness 66.9 37.9 3.1* × X × ×
Export Growth 11.3 13.0 0.8 × × × ×
Current Account 6.7 5.5 1.5* × X × ×
FDI 4.4 2.1 4.4* × X X X
Macroeconomic Condition
Real GDP Growth 4.1 7.6 0.3* × X × X
Inflation 8.6 48.6 0.0* × X X X
M2/Reserves 41.2 34.5 1.4 × × X ×
REER Overval 14.1 19.5 0.5* X × × X
Gov Expenditures 5.1 8.5 0.4* × × × X
National Saving 9.3 8.7 1.2 X × × ×
Banking Sector
Domestic Credit 45.0 66.6 0.5* X × X X
Bank Assets 40.2 50.5 0.6* X × X ×
Gov Bank Loans 19.1 23.1 0.7* × X × ×
Notes: The first two columns depict the standard deviations of the variables using the full
model during normal and crisis periods, respectively. Column three shows the F -statistic of the
variance comparison test using the full model, while the last four columns illustrate the result of
the F -test in each region separately. Both * and Xdenote statistical significance of the variance
differences at the 95% level, while × denotes no significant difference in the variances.
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